


## Inform and Influence 2020: MISO Transformation for Operational Success

by

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Class of 2012

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**INFORM AND INFLUENCE 2020:  
MISO TRANSFORMATION FOR OPERATIONAL SUCCESS**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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A series of new challenges for our military leaders will emerge in the next decade as declining budgets reduce the means available to respond to contingencies around the world. Moreover, these emerging contingencies will be both more complex and more volatile than in the past, requiring a wider mix of military capabilities if the United States is to succeed in shaping and maintaining international stability and security. Each emerging contingency will share one common challenge: success will hinge upon our Nation's ability to effectively influence a variety of audiences. Military formations specializing in this field have grown increasingly capable and relevant in the past decade. However, these forces are unable to provide all of the capabilities that tactical and operational commanders require for future success. As policy makers and senior military leaders make difficult decisions on reducing strength and transforming to meet future challenges, it is imperative that we also transform our information and influence-shaping forces, structuring them to ensure tactical, operational, and strategic success. The training and sustaining base must also transform to improve their ability to provide units and individuals with essential skills, experience and attributes.





## INFORM AND INFLUENCE 2020: MISO TRANSFORMATION FOR OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

Force can always crush force, given sufficient superiority in strength or skill. It cannot crush ideas. Being intangible, they are invulnerable, save to psychological penetration, and their resilience has baffled innumerable believers in force.

-Sir B. H. Liddell-Hart<sup>1</sup>

A series of new challenges for our military leaders will emerge in the next decade as declining budgets reduce the means available to respond to contingencies around the world. Moreover, these emerging contingencies will be both more complex and more volatile than in the past,<sup>2</sup> requiring a wider mix of military capabilities if the United States is to succeed in shaping and maintaining international stability and security. Each emerging contingency will share one common challenge: success will hinge upon our nation's ability to effectively influence a variety of audiences. Military formations specializing in this field (psychological operations or PSYOP, recently renamed military information support operations or MISO units) have grown increasingly capable and relevant in the past decade. However, these forces are unable to provide all of the capabilities that tactical and operational commanders require for future success. As policy makers and senior military leaders make difficult decisions on reducing strength and transforming to meet future challenges, it is imperative that we also transform our information and influence-shaping forces, structuring them to ensure tactical, operational, and strategic success. The training and sustaining base must also transform to improve their ability to provide units and individuals with essential skills, experience and attributes.

In his introduction to a research paper published in 2005, General (retired) Gordon Sullivan stated that achieving "the stated goals of the U.S. National Security

Strategy" will require us to develop "not only well-trained combatants and state-of-the-art weapon systems but also effective means to win the "hearts and minds" of the local populations."<sup>3</sup> This strong endorsement notwithstanding, our war fighters need inform and influence capabilities for more than just dealing with local populations. War in any of its many forms is fundamentally a human activity, and warfare as practiced by military professionals is more than indiscriminate killing. If it were simply "about killing," the military theorist Karl von Clausewitz noted that war would be an act without an object, a devolution to "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity" guided only by "blind natural force."<sup>4</sup> Warfare is, according to Clausewitz, a rational "act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,"<sup>5</sup> meaning that warfare is fundamentally a form of violent influence. British theorist B. H. Liddell-Hart expanded upon the same idea when he wrote "that the true aim in war is [to influence] the mind of the hostile rulers, not the bodies of their troops."<sup>6</sup> Even beyond European views of war, Chinese theorist Sun Tzu encouraged generals to operate in such a way as to influence their enemy and gain advantage, attacking the enemy strategy rather than his army.<sup>7</sup> Sun Tzu further advocates defeating the enemy without fighting by frustrating his plans, breaking his alliances, creating divisions between troops and leaders, sowing dissension, and encouraging subversion until the enemy is "isolated and demoralized; his will to resist broken."<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the focus of warfare is not upon killing but more importantly on influencing commanders and their subordinates through the application of violence linked to purposeful efforts to shape and direct their thinking on the potential outcome of combat.

Recent conceptual and doctrinal writings recognize that the ability to influence is critical to success even in conventional (or traditional) military conflicts where it was

once considered of lesser importance. The "Joint Operational Access Concept" (JOAC) points out that our "ability to inform and influence selected audiences to facilitate operational access before, during, and after hostilities"<sup>9</sup> is essential to success in joint military operations. The JOAC also organizes critical capabilities under the category "information" as if it were one of the approved joint functions,<sup>10</sup> underscoring its importance to the concept as a whole. Nathan Freier, in "U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020," similarly notes that "gaining and exploiting information advantages" is essential "across all operational types,"<sup>11</sup> not just counterinsurgency or stability operations where local civilian "hearts and minds" have long been thought critical. Finally, our National Military Strategy points out that success in "Deter and Defeat Aggression" will involve the use of information combined with diplomatic, economic, and military actions intended to "influence adversary behavior."<sup>12</sup>

However, as General Sullivan points out, enemy troops and leaders are not the only audiences that we must influence. Civilians populate and predominate the area where modern combat takes place, and this will become more prevalent in the future as population densities increase. Total world population will increase by about 1.2 billion between 2011 and 2025,<sup>13</sup> so the population in or near a combat or conflict zone will represent an important planning consideration in any military mission.<sup>14</sup> Both core competencies for ground forces identified in the recently published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, "combined arms maneuver" and "wide area security," incorporate activities to inform and influence both enemy and local civilian audiences.<sup>15</sup> In fact, the same publication rightfully identifies inform and influence activities as one of the four primary staff tasks listed under the "mission command" warfighting function.<sup>16</sup> Just as

forces influence enemy troops and leaders through all forms of fire and maneuver, forces also employ complimentary efforts such as camouflage, deception, and surprise, with the intent of securing an advantage and reducing the capacity and willingness of our adversaries to continue fighting. These same techniques have little applicability in efforts to influence the civilian population who would be unfortunate enough to be living in a combat zone. However, it is critical to inform and influence these civilian audiences in order to provide information that will enhance their safety, increase their understanding of why military operations are ongoing and what they are meant to accomplish, and in many cases enlist their compliance or support for a unified effort against elements that would prolong violence while encouraging the populace to provide information on enemy locations or activities. Accomplishing these elements are critical because, invariably, there are other actors attempting to shape and control the attitudes and actions of the local population and the goals of these other actors will often be at odds with the goals of the U. S. military commander.

Within any civilian population are individuals and groups that will seek to shape opinions to gain a political or personal advantage. Political leaders whose ideology and actions inspire violent conflict will seek to incite public expressions of anger toward our deployed forces. Terrorist or criminal organizations seeking safety in hiding among the population will use similar efforts to foment hatred in order to raise recruits as they also use intimidation and reprisal to control the population's behavior. Ideologically-motivated groups from within or outside the country may also attempt to undermine US prestige or create false impressions that we are untrustworthy partners. For example, North Vietnamese propaganda highlighted the offensive off-duty behavior of servicemen to

portray the U.S. as a bad partner.<sup>17</sup> During the Cold War, Soviet communist propaganda used misinformation and disinformation to influence audiences around the world.<sup>18</sup> Even today, the Chinese may be seeking to develop similar capabilities. Chinese military doctrinal texts show that they have studied closely the successful use of U.S. psychological operations in 1991 to induce large numbers of the Iraqi military to surrender,<sup>19</sup> and there are further indications that they are building a strong influence capability in the People's Liberation Army.<sup>20</sup>

Though it is certain many adversaries and some potential adversaries of the United States have or are building effective capabilities to influence audiences wherever desired, the same is not true for our allies. Among NATO countries, only two have any significant forces organized and trained for this purpose. They are the United Kingdom, fielding one psychological operations group (the 15th),<sup>21</sup> and Germany, fielding one "Operative Information" Battalion (the 950th).<sup>22</sup> Therefore, U.S. commanders can expect limited coalition support and may also have to provide influence capabilities to coalition partners. Allied nations can often provide insight into the interests and capabilities of adversaries to influence populations in their area, but have limited capability to counter adversary efforts. If allied units cannot provide the means to provide the population information critical to public safety, an unbiased counterpoint to enemy propaganda or misinformation, and inducements to cooperate with coalition forces then it will be up to the U.S. to provide those capabilities. In other words, U.S. forces need the capability to inform and influence foreign populations through effective communication in their language using media that they already have access to.

Understanding that future commanders will need the ability to inform and influence multiple audiences, what capabilities provide the necessary means to do so effectively, and what do those capabilities mean in terms of individual skills, organizations, and equipment for land forces? Capabilities needs can be determined through analysis of the Army's two core competencies for future land force conflicts. The first core competency, "combined arms maneuver," calls for the application of combat power to "defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over an enemy to seize and exploit the initiative."<sup>23</sup> Thus, during maneuver operations, information and influence are fundamentally focused on affecting the enemy. In tandem, "wide area security" calls for the application of combat power to "protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative."<sup>24</sup> Thus, in wide area security, inform and influence are fundamentally focused on civilian populations. Future MISO forces must provide the mix of capabilities to support either competency and must also retain the flexibility to transition from one to another. Both aspects of land operations require influence capabilities though audiences and objectives may differ. In both, the supported commander will need the support necessary to inform and influence enemy forces, potential enemies, and civilian populations in and near the operations area, and, in some cases, unified action partners.

Current MISO doctrine identifies six core tasks which also define the "capabilities" necessary for operational success. The first core task, "Develop," in fact encompasses a number of interrelated planning functions which require individuals and

teams that can seamlessly integrate into and operate with a supported unit staff.

Second, "Design" is the largely technical capability to translate the plan produced in the preceding step into effective product prototypes. "Produce" is the capability to create copies of an approved product prototype in the numbers and format required by the plan. "Distribute" is the ability to transport or transmit those products to those who will "Disseminate" them by delivering the products to the intended audience. Finally, "Evaluate" is described as the most resource intensive of the listed capabilities because it requires integration of personnel "into the intelligence and targeting process" of the supported unit in order to determine the effectiveness of individual products or the overall influence effort.<sup>25</sup>

These six doctrinal core tasks are a start but do not provide a complete list of all of the capabilities required by future influence forces. "Advise" is a capability highlighted in doctrine as important though it is not listed as a core task.<sup>26</sup> Advising is more than simply recommending to a supported command how best to employ MISO operations; instead it is providing recommendations regarding the psychological impacts of actions and the feasibility of courses of action from an influence perspective.<sup>27</sup> The ability to provide this expert advice complements the "Develop" capability by ensuring that inform and influence expertise is incorporated into operational planning from the beginning rather than as an "add-on." Any enabling staff capability that completes their supporting plan after the base plan is complete is unlikely to be fully integrated into execution of the plan. Strong initial involvement is critical to overcome staff bias that influence planning simply adds to "real planning." This bias also shows up in Army doctrine such as Field Manual (FM) 5-0:

During execution, action must be synchronized with themes and messages. Commanders use inform and influence activities in their area of operations to communicate, build trust and confidence, and influence perceptions and behavior. Failure to synchronize words and actions may result in adverse behavior by groups whose behavior is key to mission accomplishment.<sup>28</sup>

Here themes and messages are presented as an afterthought to actions. Though the actions and messages must be synchronized, each are developed separately then brought together for this purpose. If plans for both were developed together, the actions and the messages would be mutually supporting - both would reinforce one another rather than merely "not conflicting" with one another. If the behavior of a group is truly "key to mission accomplishment," then the actions along with the messages should be designed from the outset to influence the perceptions and behavior of the key group.

A second important capability that is implied but not explicitly stated in doctrine is to "Persuade" by influencing others in a personal or face-to-face way. Many skills essential here are also critical to *design*, such as cultural understanding and foreign language proficiency. However, a personal meeting requires additional skills such as the ability to effectively use an interpreter, conversation and negotiating skill, and the ability to think quickly and adjust to changing situations. For these reasons, it should be treated as a unique enabling capability.

Third, the capability to "Synchronize" inform and influence activities both laterally and vertically in and across organizations has become increasingly important. Influence products cannot be expected to remain within assigned unit boundaries, and conflicting products can cause "information fratricide" that damages the credibility of the supported force and other enabling products. In the past few years, the approval level for influence products has been delegated progressively toward lower unit commanders in order to



speed the approval process and increase relevance. With approval authority for some product types residing as low as the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), it is ever more important for MISO elements to synchronize with higher and adjacent units to ensure their products or messages neither implicitly nor explicitly conflict across areas of operation. However, synchronizing processes must not reverse the effect intended by delegating approval authority to the BCT, enhancing both the timeliness and relevance of influence support.

The idea of not "reversing the intended effect" is one that should guide the development of force structure. One of the remarkable changes implemented in the Army's transition to the modular force in the past decade was the shift from a division-centric force to a brigade-centric force. It was a decentralization of functions and decision-making that was never matched by commensurate changes in the supporting MISO structure. The relative lack of inform and influence capabilities found in the tactical echelons of the Army operationally limits what can be accomplished. Conversely, increasing these capabilities and capacity at brigade-level and below provides several benefits. It matches the intent of the modular transformation by placing more ability to influence closer to those who have intimate knowledge of what inform and influence activities are needed. It also increases timeliness by decentralizing decision making. Most importantly, increasing inform and influence capabilities in the lower tactical echelons will free the forces at division and higher to focus on influencing through media sources with broader operational reach and activities that support rather than supplant the activities underway at lower echelons.

As Army operations are focused on influencing people at lower levels, analysis of the current MISO force and restructuring of the future MISO force should begin with the lowest tactical elements. Under current doctrine, a tactical MISO team supports a maneuver battalion and its companies. Despite being identified in doctrine as "the most crucial link" in the influence process,<sup>29</sup> these teams are the least suited in the current force structure to providing all capabilities required by doctrine. The teams are intended to remain in close contact with identified target audiences in order to "Disseminate" products, "Persuade" through face-to-face engagements, and gather feedback on product effectiveness, which is essential to higher echelon's ability to "Evaluate" the overall effectiveness of influence programs. When direct contact with members of the target audience is not possible due to tactical or other considerations, the team can use a vehicular-mounted and a man-portable loudspeaker to "Disseminate."<sup>30</sup>

The tactical MISO team of three Soldiers led by a Staff Sergeant (pay grade E6)<sup>31</sup> is well-suited to accomplishing these three capabilities, but is inadequate to support an entire battalion. The team cannot reach a significant portion of the target audiences within a battalion's area of responsibility with the regularity required to accomplish building rapport,<sup>32</sup> especially if operations include a wide area security mission. Additionally, a single team of three cannot effectively subdivide to cover a wider area because at least two team members are needed to conduct a face-to-face mission.<sup>33</sup> Effectively supporting wide area security operations where routine, face-to-face contact with the local population is most important will require teams that can subdivide to support companies in the battalion. The infantry battalion in a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) has three infantry companies, infantry battalions in an Infantry Brigade

Combat Team (IBCT) have four, and the Combined Arms Battalions in a Heavy Brigade Combat Team have five. The most flexible organization that could support any type of battalion would be comprised of eight Soldiers organized into two teams that can each further subdivide into elements of two soldiers each. The flexibility of this organization allows for the two teams (each of four) to operate together during combined arms maneuver missions, where the size of target audiences and area to cover should be smaller, and split into smaller but still functional elements (each of two) to cover down on the greater requirements for target audience contact that will be necessary in wide area security missions.

But, beyond the larger team size needed for "Disseminate," "Persuade," and "Evaluate," what other capabilities are necessary? There is no need for "Design" capability at this level as approval authority for products has never been delegated below the BCT level. There is little need for this element to "Distribute" products because, as disseminators, they are normally on the receiving end of the doctrinal distribution network. However, providing this organization the capability to "Produce" products already designed and approved by a higher echelon will ease pressure on the distribution network in areas that lack well-developed transportation infrastructure. For print products, the provision of a high-quality, reliable print system at lower levels will increase flexibility and responsiveness for the supported commander.

The most important shortfall of the current MISO structure is in providing "Advise," "Synchronize," and "Develop" capabilities for tactical commanders. While this design flaw was not as noticeable in a division-centric structure, it is a critical shortfall in a brigade-centric structure that brings more capabilities and more important decision-

making to lower echelons. Although doctrine requires team leaders in our current structure to both lead their team and provide planning support to the battalion staff,<sup>34</sup> in practice team leaders have to divide their time between this function and focusing on their primary dissemination mission.<sup>35</sup> In fact, the MISO branch is unique in expecting their Staff Sergeants to possess and apply the same skills that all other branches expect from a mid-grade Captain. A research paper published by the Army War College in 2007 affirms the need for an officer to command the element supporting a maneuver battalion, but asserts even more strongly that it should be a Major.<sup>36</sup> Current doctrine recognizes the need for an officer at this level during stability operations, with tactical detachments (commanded by a Captain<sup>37</sup>) supporting battalions rather than brigades.<sup>38</sup> Unfortunately, MISO deployments have not always been sized at the force levels recommended in doctrine. For example, as forces in Iraq transitioned to stability operations in 2010, MISO forces were reduced from one detachment per BCT to only one or two teams, severely constraining the influence support that could be provided during this critical stage of operations.

A Captain commanding the MISO element supporting a maneuver battalion alone provides significant capabilities for both "Develop" and "Synchronize." Because it is likely this Captain will be an officer who but recently transitioned to the MISO branch, a noncommissioned or warrant officer with more extensive inform and influence experience should also serve here. This addition provides not just practical experience but also the depth needed to support continuous battalion operations. This team is also far better suited "Advise" a battalion commander and his staff. At least two more personnel are necessary to round out this headquarters team, one for providing

coordination, planning, and tracking to the dissemination teams and another to operate and maintain the printer. This element provides all of the capabilities needed to provide inform and influence support to a maneuver battalion conducting either combined arms maneuver or wide area security. This element also frees the noncommissioned officers leading the dissemination teams to focus on troop leading and providing support to the companies, resulting in far more robust and effective dissemination where it is most important.

In the current MISO force structure, the element that supports a BCT is a MISO detachment headquarters, which is better suited to its mission than the MISO team supporting a battalion. However, it too requires additional capabilities to adequately support future combat operations. The detachment headquarters is composed of four personnel, one of which is a Captain serving as detachment commander.<sup>39</sup> It is intended primarily to provide "Develop" capability to the brigade headquarters, but the small size of the unit is a hindrance in this. Planning, targeting, and staff coordination are all more demanding and complex in a current BCT, and four personnel are too few to integrate fully where needed. The detachment also lacks the personnel required to "Evaluate" the effectiveness of current efforts. It is also equipped to temporarily field a MISO team when additional "Persuade" or "Disseminate" capabilities are needed, but this further distracts personnel needed to provide other capabilities.

Though approval authority for some products has been delegated down to the BCT, the detachment headquarters element lacks the skilled personnel and equipment necessary to properly "Design" products. Thus, they are reliant on capabilities resident at the division-level MISO element. Though not authorized on the unit's Modified Table

of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), the detachment will usually have one or more printers because it is difficult to "Distribute" products produced and transported from the division. However, no additional personnel are allocated to operate and maintain the printer. While the detachment headquarters has the capacity to "Synchronize" the actions of subordinate teams, the element's small size and the junior rank of the detachment commander limits their capability to effectively "Advise" the supported BCT commander or his staff.

Because the centerpiece of Army operations has shifted from the division to the BCT, the supporting MISO element needs a more robust ability to integrate with the staff and "Develop" a mutually-supporting influence plan. This also provides additional avenues to "Advise" the supported commander and his staff. A more robust ability to "Evaluate" the integration and effectiveness of information and influence is also needed, and since the battalion level MISO elements are now more capable, the capability to "Synchronize" their efforts must also be improved. With the delegation of approval authority for products down to the BCT, the capability to "Design" tailored products, "Produce" products needed, and "Distribute" the products to where they are needed must be expanded. Here, distribution capabilities should also include the expertise and equipment needed to package leaflets into bundles that can be released over a target area using rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft. Since the elements supporting the battalions have more capability to "Persuade" and "Disseminate," there is potentially little need to retain redundant capability at the BCT. However, the current force structure lacks the ability to disseminate information using civilian radio at any level, unless the capability is provided from a small pool of equipment and skilled operators found in specialized

MISO formations located at Fort Bragg, NC and in Los Alamitos, CA.<sup>40</sup> However, such tailored capabilities should be available down to the BCT level to provide the commander the means to communicate directly to large audiences over the extended distance of the unit's operations area. Such functional teams should be organized into detachments with a development section that provides expertise to integrate broadcast methods into staff planning, targeting, and information operations efforts. The detachment should also include a current operations team to synchronize and integrate broadcast efforts with ongoing influence operations.

After expanding the capabilities to inform and influence at lower tactical levels, the MISO formations at division and higher will be able to focus on activities that better complement and support the actions of lower units. In the current MISO force structure, a division is supported by a MISO company-level headquarters supplemented by a development detachment and a production detachment. The company is commanded by a Major, with each detachment commanded by a Captain.<sup>41</sup> This structure provides robust capabilities to support operations and it is much better suited to providing the holistic capabilities needed in the future. However, this organization still requires substantial improvements where capabilities are out of date. For example, while the "Develop" and "Synchronize" capabilities inherent here are good, "Design" and "Produce" capabilities are somewhat redundant to those that support the BCT. While this element lacks an organizational structure to "Evaluate" operations effectively, it has the personnel necessary to accomplish some measure this capability. The personnel here are sufficient to "Persuade" high-level target audiences in a face-to-face role through accompanying division leadership in key leader engagements, but need a unit

organized for this mission to ensure that the capability will be employed more often.<sup>42</sup>

The company team organization also lacks the ability to "Disseminate" products to support lower echelons effectively, through radio, broadcast television, and internet. Additionally, they are often forced to request assets from the supported unit to "Distribute" products. Finally, while they have better capability to "Advise" than BCT detachments, they similarly lack the depth to accomplish this effectively given the rank structure of a Major or Captain being paired with a general officer commander.

The current structure for providing MISO support to a Corps or equivalent Joint Task Force is difficult to define because a MTOE structure for this mission does not exist.<sup>43</sup> Current practice is to deploy personnel from a MISO battalion headquarters with assets from a dissemination battalion or company to provide tailored capabilities necessary for the mission. However, due to their non-standard organization, it is difficult to analyze how well this structure is suited to Corps missions. Instead, I will propose the structure which should be reflected in a deployable MTOE organization to provide the capabilities needed.

Although the structures already discussed also require change, my overall recommendation is to shift our current level of MISO forces downward by an echelon. In this construct, a MISO detachment of 16 personnel<sup>44</sup> is reduced in strength to twelve and shifted from supporting a BCT to supporting a maneuver battalion. The MISO company headquarters, also reduced in size, shifts from supporting a division to supporting a BCT. Third, a standardized, deployable MISO battalion headquarters should be redirected from corps to division, and a similarly standardized MISO Group Headquarters would support a corps or joint task force headquarters. This last change



is perhaps the most significant because the Group headquarters is currently restricted to the mission of a "force provider" rather than a deployable formation, and increased operational needs may dictate a need to grow additional Group headquarters structures. This may also require a headquarters above the group level to take over force generation responsibilities, a requirement necessitated by changes in education and training to fill expanded force structure with qualified personnel, and develop new concepts and doctrine.

Organizational changes alone will not ensure that MISO commanders will have access to the influence capabilities they will need to successfully overcome future challenges. Those organizations must be filled by professionals with the necessary qualifications who have been trained in the right skills and who have had access to experiences that deepen their cultural understanding. The sustaining and generating base for the MISO force today is focused on sourcing mission requirements for Afghanistan, and does not have the depth of personnel or resources necessary to accomplish ongoing missions while concurrently recruiting and training the force needed in the next decade.

In Psychological Warfare, Paul Linebarger draws on his experiences in World War Two to describe five essential qualifications for successful influence activities that are still applicable today. However, Linebarger makes the point that no one person can hope to embody all five qualities, so success will be based upon combining individuals with one or more qualifications into teams whose skills complement one another.<sup>45</sup> Linebarger's first qualification, "a working knowledge of U.S. government administration and policy,"<sup>46</sup> is essential considering that tactical influence messages cannot conflict

with higher policies. However, it is not essential for every MISO Soldier down to the tactical teams be familiar with U.S. government policy. Rather, MISO leaders and planners supporting a BCT and higher must be at least conversant with US policies and the plans developed at higher echelons in order to nest inform and influence operations within them. The requirement for a depth of understanding of US policy increases at each higher echelon precisely because each plan must not only avoid conflicting with policy but must also be developed in such a way that both policy and the influence plans complement one another.

Linebarger's second qualification is "an effective knowledge of correct military and naval procedure and of staff operations" as well as "understanding of the arts of warfare."<sup>47</sup> This is an essential element of a MISO officer's role to successfully advise a supported commander and his staff. Understanding staff processes is also important in overcoming the inertia of routine staff functions that would decrease the timeliness of influence support.<sup>48</sup> It often takes a great deal of time to complete staff action and gain approval for a MISO authority, and prototype product approval and the move into production and dissemination can also take a great deal of time unless processes are streamlined to the maximum extent possible.

Third, Linebarger recommends a "professional knowledge of the media of information."<sup>49</sup> Again, this is less essential at the lower echelons of MISO force structure where the most significant form of dissemination is through face-to-face engagements. However, at higher echelons a working knowledge of print, broadcast media, internet, and other avenues of dissemination becomes increasingly important. There are two facets of this qualification - a scientific or technical mastery of the mechanics used to

create products in a particular media, and an understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses that limit our ability to convey an idea through a particular media.<sup>50</sup> Both facets of this qualification must be developed and available to the larger influence team effort.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, one must have "intimate, professional-level understanding" of the intended audience "based on first-hand acquaintance, knowledge of the language, traditions, history, practical politics, and customs."<sup>51</sup> This qualification is critical because it is the foundation of "Persuade," "Develop," and "Design" capabilities. Persuasive face-to-face communication is extremely difficult without this depth of understanding of the target audience. Additionally, developing plans to change an audience's attitudes and behavior and effective product design require a deep knowledge of the target audience. This qualification is foundational and difficult because it takes a great investment of time to build. Therefore, it should be part of the MISO expert's initial training that is built on deliberately over an individual's career.

Linebarger's fifth qualification is a "professional scientific understanding of psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, or a comparable field."<sup>52</sup> Some understanding of the first field should also be treated as foundational and incorporated into initial training curricula, but the complexity of these fields also requires a significant investment in time to build understanding. This is why the listed disciplines are university degree programs and are best imparted to MISO experts either through initial entry degree programs or through continuing education programs that allow personnel to pursue advanced degrees.

Understanding the five qualifications is also to understand that great expertise requires study spanning a career, reinforcing Linebarger's assertion that only teams, not individuals, can hope to exhibit depth in all five. Recruiting and training individuals must come from an improved generating base that prepares and provides the forces to meet deployment requirements. While initial training programs provide the baseline qualifications needed for soldiers transitioning to MISO and need only modest improvements, extended education programs do not provide the training or experience that develops a depth of expertise. Two reasons for this are the focus on providing forces to meet current deployment requirements, and the requirement to qualify Soldiers to fill the new G-series MTOE structures created between 2008 and 2011. Neither of these requirements are permanent challenges, so the sustaining base must adapt to provide the individual and collective training, education, experience, and necessary qualifications.

First, the career path for both officers and enlisted MISO personnel must incorporate a learning model that spans an entire career. This model should be focused on the qualifications outlined above rather than the current narrow focus on officer and NCO professional development courses. Full-term officer and enlisted qualification courses must be required for all personnel rather than the shortened course designed to more quickly qualify personnel to fill out deploying formations. Additional education opportunities that enable leaders to pursue a degree program in psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, foreign language studies, or marketing are also necessary. Language training in particular is difficult, especially for Army Reserve personnel who make up the majority of the MISO force and nearly all of

the tactical MISO structure. Because of the length of time reserve personnel would spend away from their civilian jobs for a military language course, these personnel must be given access to the shorter language training courses offered at Fort Bragg rather than the longer courses offered at the Defense Language Institute. After building this base of language ability, it can best be sustained using targeted college courses and training missions to areas where the language is used.

This training investment will be expensive and should be capitalized on by retaining the participants over as long a period as possible. The more experienced a MISO professional becomes, the more valuable to the success of the team whose pool of qualifications he contributes to. The grade structure of the new MISO organization must take this into account, allowing soldiers and officers to be retained for longer periods with more promotion possibilities within the force. A warrant officer program for MISO specialists would be extremely valuable as a vehicle to retain the most talented NCO's and soldiers.

The units themselves need to be better resourced to provide unit members with training opportunities. Specifically, the units need to be provided with opportunity for overseas deployments, ideally as part of Combatant Command shaping operations, to build cultural and language experience in a real-world context. The tactical MISO force also needs better peacetime linkage to the combat units they will support during deployments. This can be sequenced, as part of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, or persistent, through an arrangement similar to the past WARTRACE<sup>53</sup> model. Either linkage will allow MISO units to learn procedures and build

relationships with supported units before deployment and result in better integration for future operations.

Military and civilian leaders today are challenged to reduce costs while preparing for future conflicts. They must predict both what challenges the future will bring and what the United States will want to do about those challenges. The optimal outcome of a thorough review of MISO force structure will provide decision makers with numerous options to prevent or solve future inform and influence problems. Investing in improvements to current MISO structure and policies outlined above will greatly increase the ability of military forces to be effective in influencing key leaders and groups in the future. Most significantly, the structure proposed decentralizes MISO capabilities from the division-centric to the brigade-centric force. Increasing the number of personnel at the BCT and subordinate battalions will increase our abilities to subdivide and cover large areas with multiple simultaneous actions, rapidly analyze, target, and deliver influence products and actions, and provide cultural expertise and influence advice to combat commanders. However, structural changes alone will not be able to provide the capabilities needed as the force generation base of our Army must also adapt to provide the necessary training and education to fill that force structure with skilled personnel.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 235.

<sup>2</sup> Nathan Freier, *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2011), 4, [http://csis.org/files/publication/111011\\_Freier\\_USGroundForceCapa\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/111011_Freier_USGroundForceCapa_Web.pdf) (accessed October 31, 2011).

<sup>3</sup> GEN(ret) Sullivan's comments are in the forward to Arthur Tulak, *Improving Tactical PSYOP Video Dissemination in Media-Austere Operating Environments* (Arlington, Virginia: Association of the US Army, January 2005), v.

<sup>4</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>6</sup> Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 204.

<sup>7</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66, 77.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept* (Washington, DC: 11 November, 2011), 36.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>11</sup> Nathan Freier, *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020*, Appendix B (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2011), 2, [http://csis.org/files/publication/111020\\_Freier\\_USGroundForces\\_Appendices.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/111020_Freier_USGroundForces_Appendices.pdf) (accessed October 31, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> M. G. Mullen, ADM, U.S. Navy. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington DC: 8 February, 2011), 7-10.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>14</sup> Freier, *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities*, 4.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 10, 2011), 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>17</sup> Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 201.

<sup>18</sup> John Berlau, "Top scholar of 'dezinformatsia' still expert at telling it like it is," May 26, 1997, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1571/is\\_n19\\_v13/ai\\_19448573/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_n19_v13/ai_19448573/) (accessed November 2, 2011).

<sup>19</sup> Timothy L. Thomas, "New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare," *Special Warfare* (April 2003), 2.

<sup>20</sup> Vinod Anand, "Chinese Concepts and Capabilities of Information Warfare," October 2006, [http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChineseConceptsandCapabilitiesofInformationWarfare\\_vanand\\_1006](http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChineseConceptsandCapabilitiesofInformationWarfare_vanand_1006) (accessed January 26, 2012)

<sup>21</sup> UK 15th PSYOPS Group, "Annual Report 2007/08," [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.army.mod.uk/15psyops/annual\\_report.htm](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.army.mod.uk/15psyops/annual_report.htm) (accessed October 23, 2011).

<sup>22</sup> "Germany Calling: German Bundeswehr Prepares for Psychological Warfare," October 23, 2002, translated October 28 2002, <http://www.freenations.freeuk.com/gc-14.html>. (accessed October 23, 2011); Herbert A. Friedman, "United States PSYOP in Somalia," <http://www.psywarrior.com/SomaliaHerb.html>, (accessed October 23, 2011).

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, 6.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.30 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 15, 2005), 1-5,1-6; U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Change 1 to Field Manual 3-05.302 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 6, 2009), 1-1.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, 1-3; U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 1-2.

<sup>27</sup> Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), 98.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, Change 1 to Field Manual 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 18, 2011), 5-2.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Change 1 to Field Manual 3-05.302 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 6, 2009), 2-6.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 2-7.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 2-6.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, 3-10

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 7-17.

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, 3-10; U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 2-6.

<sup>35</sup> For an appreciation of the scope of divided responsibilities, see pages 7-1 to 7-3 then compare to the mission tasks outlined on the remaining pages of chapter 7 in U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

<sup>36</sup> Michael A. Ceroli. *Psychological Operations: Fighting the War of Ideas*. Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 18 May 2007), 3.



<sup>37</sup> United States Army, *Tactical PSYOP Company Modified Table of Organization and Equipment*, DOCNO 33737GAR19 (n.p. September 16, 2010).

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, 3-9; U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 2-4.

<sup>39</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 2-6.

<sup>40</sup> United States Army, *Psychological Operations Handbook: Equipment Types, Specifications, and Capabilities*, Graphic Training Aid 33-01-002 (Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, April 2005), 2, 36-43; United States Army, *PSYOP Strategic Dissemination Company Modified Table of Organization and Equipment*, DOCNO 33757AAR01 (n.p. September 17, 2008).

<sup>41</sup> United States Army, *Tactical PSYOP Company MTOE*, DOCNO 33737GAR19.

<sup>42</sup> Leigh Armistead, ed., *Information Operations* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 2004), 177.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 2-1.

<sup>44</sup> United States Army, *Tactical PSYOP Company MTOE*, DOCNO 33737GAR19.

<sup>45</sup> Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 101.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, DA Pamphlet 525-7-1/2 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 1976), 274-6.

<sup>49</sup> Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 99.

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations*, 271-2, 277.

<sup>51</sup> Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 101.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> The WARTRACE program aligned units under what was expected to be their wartime headquarters. The program was intended to improve planning associations among other things. For more information, see Army Regulation 11-30.

